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Abstract
Merchant guilds have been portrayed as “social networks” that gen-
erated beneficial “social capital” by sustaining shared norms, effectively
transmitting information, and successfully undertaking collective action.
This social capital, it is claimed, benefited society as a whole because it of-
fered a substitute for missing political institutions, creating a countervailing
power that enabled medieval rulers to commit to provide a secure trading
environment for alien merchants. But was this really the case? We develop
an alternative model, in which merchant guilds emerge as a substitute for
missing economic institutions (in particular, effective fiscal mechanisms),
and their social capital is used to sustain economic and political collusion
with rulers, to the detriment of other groups in society. We show that the
available historical evidence strongly supports our “collusion model”, and
refutes the existing “commitment model”.
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1. Introduction
The merchant guild is unquestionably the most important historical institution
adduced as evidence that social networks and “social capital” benefit the entire
economy.1 It is therefore often used as a leading example by those advocating in-
vestment in social capital and social networks to solve problems of social exclusion
and regional disparities in the rich West, economic transition in Eastern Europe,
and development challenges in the Third World. Thus, for instance, in a speech
to the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz lists “guilds” among those institutions which,
by generating social capital, could “support entrepreneurial efforts” in Eastern
European transition economies.2 Pranab Bardhan claims that merchant guilds
have benefited commerce historically and urges more studies of how social capital
can benefit commerce in modern developing economies.3 In a survey of social
capital and economic development, Partha Dasgupta refers to the merchant guild
as a social network whose social capital facilitated commercial growth.4
These views are based on a particular model of medieval European merchant
guilds, advanced by Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) (henceforth GMW).
That model presents merchant guilds as institutions that facilitated information
transmission, enforced shared norms and overcame obstacles to collective action,
to the benefit of society as a whole. Specifically, GMW argue that “merchant
guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers
to commit to the security of alien merchants”, thereby “laying an important in-
stitutional foundation for the growing trade of that period”. Their argument is
based on the following idea. Individual merchants engaging in long-distance inter-
national trade faced high risks resulting from general commercial insecurity and
arbitrary confiscations by rulers. Without a credible commitment by the ruler
of a given trade center to provide a secure trading environment and himself re-
frain from confiscations, individual alien merchants might have been deterred from
trading there. GMW show that if alien merchants belonged to an organization
which could act in their collective interest and which had the power to enforce
compliance by each individual member, the ruler’s commitment problem could be
solved. In particular, the merchant organization could threaten a trade boycott
if the ruler “misbehaved”, and this (credible) threat could induce the ruler to be-
have well by providing security. GMW then argue that merchant guilds emerged
1For definitions and discussion of the concept of social capital, see Bourdieu (1986); Coleman
(1988, 1990); Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000); Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002); Lin
(2001); Ogilvie (2003); Putnam (2000); Putnam et al. (1993); Sobel (2002).
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with the support of alien rulers of trade centers in order to overcome their com-
mitment problem. It is easy to see why this has led so many economists to regard
the merchant guild as an exemplar of social capital: these guilds fostered shared
norms, transmitted information effectively, punished deviants swiftly, and orga-
nized collective action efficiently. And in GMW’s theory, they used this shared
capital to provide a countervailing power to that of medieval rulers, to the benefit
of the whole society.
But is this appealing view of merchant guilds correct? In this paper, we identify
the key empirical implications of the GMW “commitment” model and confront
them with the abundant historical evidence on medieval merchant guilds. We
find no support for the claim that merchant guilds emerged to enable rulers to
commit to the security of alien merchants. We then propose a new model of the
emergence of merchant guilds which is borne out by the empirical findings and
has very different political economy implications. Far from exerting a socially
beneficial countervailing power to the power of medieval rulers, merchant guilds
in our model use their social capital to collude effectively with rulers, thereby
maximizing their joint rents. Under the most plausible informational assumptions
for the historical context under study, we find that the emergence of merchant
guilds benefits rulers but harms other groups in society, notably consumers. We
conclude that it is important to analyze the role of social capital in sustaining
political and economic collusion.
The main steps in our argument are the following. The commitment model
proposed by GMW is a theory of the emergence of alien merchant guilds, that
is, organizations of alien merchants trading in a particular polity (trade center),
with the support (legal recognition) of the local ruler. However, GMW present
the model as a general theory of the emergence of merchant guilds. There are two
problems with this. First, the claim is inconsistent with the historical evidence:
as richly documented in section 2 below, the vast majority of merchant guilds
were local associations of traders in a particular urban community, enjoying legal
and economic privileges from their local rulers (notably monopoly rights over local
trade). Only a minority were active in alien polities, and even these only enjoyed
recognition from alien rulers by virtue of support by their own local rulers. Sec-
ond, by ignoring merchant guilds’ primarily local focus and the nature of their
relationships with their local rulers, GMW miss a crucial point: the emergence of
local and alien merchant guilds were closely related, and need to be understood
within a single framework. Their commitment model cannot offer such a frame-
work, since it cannot account for the emergence of local merchant guilds, as we
make clear in section 2 below.
The framework we propose identifies a key benefit that medieval rulers derived
from the establishment of merchant organizations endowed with monopoly rights
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over local trade: these organizations enabled rulers to maximize their revenues
from the taxation of local trade. In the absence of merchant organizations, rulers
would have had to delegate the collection of taxes on local trade to agents who
would have been able to earn substantial rents from their superior knowledge of
local conditions. By endowing merchant guilds with monopoly rights in return for
appropriate transfers, rulers were able to circumvent the need to give away signif-
icant rents to third parties. Most importantly for rulers, merchant organizations,
unlike tax collectors, could afford to “pay” ex ante for their ex-post informational
rents.5
A ruler could therefore maximize his revenue from the taxation of local trade,
as we demonstrate in Section 4, by establishing a merchant guild and requiring
it to make regular fixed payments, in return for exemption from other forms of
taxation, together with the legal right to exclude non-members from trade, to
levy dues from members, and to sanction members who “misbehaved”. There is
ample historical evidence, reviewed in section 5, that this is exactly what took
place. Our theory can therefore explain not only the emergence of local merchant
guilds, but also their relationship with rulers, including the specific privileges they
were granted and the transfers they made in return.
Among the privileges generally granted by medieval rulers to local merchant
guilds was the requirement for alien merchants to trade only with members of
the local merchant guild, or using local guild members as intermediaries. This is
consistent with our explanation, since it gave the local merchant guild all the bar-
gaining power in negotiating with individual alien merchants, thereby protecting
the guild’s rents. But it also provides a rationale, discussed in section 5 below, for
the emergence of alien merchant guilds - typically as foreign branches (“colonies”
or “consulates”) of local merchant guilds, which obtained legal recognition from
foreign rulers. Our theory can therefore account for the fact that alien merchant
guilds appear to have emerged somewhat later than local merchant guilds, and
generally continued to be dependent, to a greater or lesser extent, on the local
merchant guild of their home city, as documented in section 2 below. Our model
further shows that rulers could obtain similar fiscal benefits from alien merchant
guilds as from local merchant guilds. The last main body of empirical evidence
we present in section 5 is consistent with this implication, and reveals a similar
pattern of exchange of privileges (including monopoly rights and tax exemptions)
for transfers.
5Individuals willing to act as tax collectors possessed very little capital as a rule, as shown by
the historical evidence discussed in Section 3. Thus they could not have “paid” ex ante for their
ex-post rents by making transfers to the ruler. The merchants themselves, on the other hand,
typically possessed sufficient capital, by pooling their resources, to make the required payments
to the ruler, as documented in Section 4.
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organization, and show that a merchant guild able to compel its members to act
cooperatively offers the most credible solution to the problem, making it possible
to sustain the efficient level of trade. In particular, the merchant guild needs to
be able to credibly threaten a complete boycott of trade if the ruler cheats: this
credible threat deters the ruler from cheating, and thereby solves his commitment
problem.
2.2. A model of alien merchant guilds
It is worth emphasizing that the commitment model is a model of the emergence
of alien merchant guilds. The reason is simple: merchants, by assumption, can
always obtain a payoff of zero by not turning up for trade. This puts a conve-
nient upper bound on their loss from boycotting trade. For alien merchants, the
assumption is entirely appropriate. Indeed, alien merchants typically could stay
away from a given city and take their trade to other cities. Local merchants, on
the other hand, would have been under the local ruler’s jurisdiction, and could
therefore be punished if they behaved in ways that conflicted with the ruler’s in-
terest: for example, by boycotting local trade (not to mention the difficulties of
living in a city under a trade embargo). Being members of a local merchant guild
would not have afforded them adequate protection against a powerful local ruler.
True, medieval rulers sometimes had relatively little power and resources. Such
“weak” rulers might not be able to punish effectively local merchants who chose
to boycott trade. However, the same weak rulers would not be able to confiscate
local merchants’ property in the first place, nor would they be able to provide
effective protection against third parties and hence a secure trading environment.
Thus the commitment problem considered by GMW would never arise with a
weak ruler. Only “strong” rulers, with sufficient coercive power and resources,
could have a commitment problem; but then the problem could not be solved by
establishing a guild of local merchants.
Thus the GMW explanation for the emergence of merchant guilds, namely,
that it provided a solution to the commitment problem faced by rulers, cannot
apply to local merchants and local merchant guilds.
2.3. Empirical implications
We can therefore identify the following key empirical implications of the GMW
theory of the emergence of medieval merchant guilds. We should find that:
(1) Merchant guilds were first and foremost organizations of alien merchants,
established in medieval cities with the support of the local rulers of those cities.
(2) The establishment of alien merchant guilds enabled rulers to solve their
commitment problem and hence provide a secure trading environment for alien
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merchants.
2.4. The historical evidence
The available historical evidence, reviewed below, contradicts the first of the two
implications given above, and provides no support for the other, casting doubt on
the empirical relevance of the GMW explanation for the emergence of merchant
guilds. For reasons of space, only a few salient examples are highlighted in the
text; references to the main body of evidence are given in the footnotes, and
a much more detailed and longer discussion can be found in Dessí and Ogilvie
(2003).
2.4.1. Local and alien merchant guilds
The first body of evidence which contradicts the GMW theory is the fact that
the vast majority of merchant guilds were local associations of the traders of a
particular urban community, which initially obtained privileges from their local
rulers.6 Only a minority of these local merchant guilds went on to form “colonies”
abroad, which obtained legal recognition from foreign rulers. Moreover, these
colonies or alien merchant guilds continued to be dependent on their localities of
origin for power and legitimacy.
Origins and evolution of merchant guilds. The origins of medieval mer-
chant guilds are lost in the Dark Ages (c. 500 - c. 1000 AD) because of a severe
lack of documentation, although parallels are sometimes drawn with ancient Ro-
man merchant collegia. Nevertheless it is clear that among the collegia, schola,
and ministeria attested in the towns that survived the Dark Ages, and among the
merchant “guilds” proper which emerged in old and new urban settlements alike
from the eleventh century onward, local merchant organizations predominated.
These were associations among the merchants of a particular locality, which ini-
tially obtained from their local rulers exclusive rights to practise certain types
of local commercial activity.7 These privileges were economically significant: al-
though local trade left many fewer records and was much less glamorous than
long-distance trade, it is now widely recognized as having made up a significant
share of medieval European commerce, and hence as offering substantial rents
to those who could obtain monopolies within it.8 Only a minority of merchants,
6Bernard (1972); Dessí and Ogilvie (2003); Ehbrecht (1985); Schütt (1980).
7Bernard (1972); Dilcher (1985); Ehbrecht (1985); Johanek (1999); Racine (1985); Schütt
(1980); Volckart and Mangels (1999).
8Abulafia (1995, 1997, 1999); Blockmans (2000); Bernard (1972); Epstein (1992); Spufford
(2000); Theuerkauf (1996).
7
and only those from a minority of cities, expanded their operations beyond their
own local area and traded in alien polities.9 These merchants often established
“colonies” or “consulates” of their local merchant guild by obtaining legal recog-
nition from an alien ruler. However, most local merchant guilds never became
important players in international trade - this was the case not only in the vast
majority of smaller medieval cities, but also in many more important cities, such
as Bordeaux, Liège, Paris and Rome.10 While most merchant guilds were not
active in long-distance trade to any significant extent, all of them enjoyed con-
siderable economic privileges in their own cities, including monopoly rights over
local trade.11 Indeed, Bruges itself, the “undisputed fulcrum” of long-distance
trade in northern Europe, had an exceptionally powerful merchant guild whose
members drew their profits not from engaging in long-distance trade but from
their “staple” rights through which they obliged alien merchants in Bruges to
trade through their sole intermediation.12
Paucity of documentation makes it difficult to date the origins of different
types of merchant guild, but it appears to be the case that whereas the first lo-
cal merchant guilds date from the tenth and eleventh centuries, the first alien
merchant guilds date from somewhat later: “Alien merchants first established
colonies in the early twelfth century in the markets of the East - such as Acre,
Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople - and soon after that in Rome, Naples,
and Palermo.”13 Once established, alien merchant guilds continued to be depen-
dent, to a greater or lesser extent, on the local merchant guild at home. Most
alien merchant guilds were closely monitored by their home cities. Thus, for ex-
ample, Florentine merchant colonies abroad had their consuls appointed by the
Arte di Calimala, the local merchant guild in Florence.14 Flemish merchant guilds
in Champagne and England were accompanied on trading expeditions by officers
from their own local merchant guilds at home - “guild wardens and inspectors
who had absolute authority over them”.15 Moreover, alien merchant colonies suc-
ceeded in obtaining recognition and privileges from alien rulers only by virtue
of their legal recognition by their own rulers as guilded merchants in their home
9Bahr (1911); Bernard (1972); Daenell (1905); Dollinger (1970); Epstein (2000); Hlavácek
(2000); Johanek (1999); Laiou (2000); Prevenier (2000); Schultze (1985).
10See Bernard (1972) and Epstein (2000) on French cities; Hlavácek (2000) on German-
speaking central Europe; Bahr (1911), Daenell (1905), Dollinger (1970) and Prevenier (2000) on
the Low Countries; Johanek (1999) on Italy; Johanek (1999) and Laiou (2000) on the Byzantine
Empire.






cities. For example, the merchant guild of Barcelona was able to obtain and keep
its privileges from the rulers of Tunis and Alexandria between 1250 and 1264 only
thanks to the recognition it enjoyed locally in Barcelona from King James I of
Catalonia, and the diplomacy and military threats he was willing to exercise on
its behalf with Muslim rulers.16 Indeed, alien merchant guilds’ continued depen-
dence on the political support of their home rulers in their dealings with alien
rulers is at odds with the notion that alien merchant guilds could, by themselves,
provide a countervailing power to that of rulers of international trade centers,
which would solve these rulers’ commitment problem. Thus in 1231, for instance,
after the ruler of Cueta confiscated Genoese merchants’ goods, he was penalized
not by an embargo by the Genoese merchant guild there, but by being attacked
by the Genoese fleet.17
Even the famous “Hansas” of long-distance merchants were simply associations
among the local merchant guilds of a number of cities for the purposes of foreign
trade.18 The prime example is that of the German Hansa, an association among
the merchant guilds of 70 north German, Dutch, and Baltic cities (with another
130 in looser association). There were also less important associations such as that
formed by the merchant guilds of 17 Flemish and French towns in the thirteenth
century, or the coalitions of the merchant guilds of certain Italian cities for the
purposes of trading in France or the Levant. All “Hansas”, however, were pre-
dated by their constituent local guilds and continued to derive their power and
legitimacy from their recognition by local rulers in their localities of origin.19
Thus some local merchant guilds - a minority - formed “colonies” or joined
“Hansas” abroad in order to transact in alien polities. But all local merchant
guilds enjoyed privileges from their own local rulers over local trade. This is
not consistent with GMW’s theory that merchant guilds emerged and survived
because they overcame problems of security in alien polities and problems of
commitment faced by alien rulers.
2.4.2. Commercial insecurity
A second body of evidence casting doubt on the GMW theory relates to the effect
merchant guilds actually exerted on commercial insecurity. GMW argue that
merchant guilds increased commercial security by enabling rulers to commit to
provide a secure trading environment for alien merchants. Is there any evidence
16On this example, see Abulafia (2000). See also Bernard (1972) on Italian merchant
“colonies” in the Levant and Africa, and Hørby (1984) on Danish merchants in England.
17Kohn (2003); Reynolds (1945).
18De Roover (1963); Planitz (1940); Reyerson (2000); Volckart and Mangels (1999).
19See Abulafia (1988); Bernard (1972), Blockmans (2000); Choroskevic (1996); Daenell (1905);
De Roover (1963); Dollinger (1970); Hibbert (1963); Irsigler (1985); and Planitz (1940).
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for this?
Alien rulers often granted - even in the Dark Ages - guarantees of protection to
long-distance merchants.20 In many cases, rulers simply granted these to individ-
ual merchants on an ad hoc basis. As alien merchant guilds became established,
security guarantees were increasingly issued to guilds. But there is no evidence
that when these security guarantees were issued to guilds rather than individual
merchants it actually had the effect of increasing the overall level of commercial
security. The only support for this view is theoretical: it amounts to a coun-
terfactual argument that the threat of guild boycotts increased rulers’ incentives
to enforce their security guarantees, and thus without merchant guilds insecurity
would have been higher.
Hard evidence, by contrast, exists for the opposite view: namely, that mer-
chant guilds were significant contributors to commercial insecurity. Most major
centers of long-distance trade had several merchant guilds, and conflicts between
them were a source of commercial insecurity for merchants. There were frequent
violent conflicts in foreign cities among the guilds of rival alien merchants.21 Even
more frequent were conflicts between a guild of alien merchants and the guild (or
other organization) of the local merchants: many cases in which merchants oper-
ating in a foreign city were attacked by mobs, failed to obtain fair legal treatment,
or suffered from acts of piracy occurred precisely because of rivalry with the local
merchant guild over privileges from the ruler.22
Indeed, one reason long-distance merchants so consistently asked alien rulers
for security guarantees was precisely because they expected to be legally harrassed
or violently attacked by local merchant guilds which regarded themselves as en-
titled to exclusive rights to trade in particular territories or particular lines of
business. Part of the problem was due to the “incompleteness” of the “contracts”
between rulers and merchant guilds: the legal privileges originally granted by
rulers to local guilds typically did not specify with sufficient precision and detail
the exact nature of their rights in all possible contingencies, which left significant
scope for subsequent interpretation and conflict, as well as renegotiation between
rulers and guilds.
Thus merchant organizations themselves, and the privileges granted to them
by rulers, were often the source of - not the solution to - commercial insecurity.
20Planitz (1940); Racine (1985); Schütt (1980).
21On these, see Abulafia (1978, 1986); De Roover (1963); Greif et al. (1994); Pryor (2000);
Reyerson (2000); and Smith (1940).
22On these, see Bahr (1911); Daenell (1905); Dollinger (1970); Lloyd (1991); Postan (1973);
Schütt (1980).
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2.4.3. Privileges and transfers
Finally, the GMW theory does not account for a universal feature of merchant
guilds - namely, that they obtained monopoly privileges in exchange for payments
to rulers. As richly documented below in Section 5, both local and alien merchant
guilds gave rulers lump-sum transfers, advantageous loans, military assistance,
and other benefits. In return, rulers granted them a wide array of legal privileges
enabling them to secure economic rents.23 Explaining this ubiquitous stylized fact
is crucial to understanding the emergence and evolution of merchant guilds, and
their implications for the well-being of the societies in which they were embedded.
3. Our model
The GMW explanation for the emergence of merchant guilds is thus inconsistent
with major bodies of empirical evidence. Here we propose an alternative theory
of merchant guilds, which can account for the available historical evidence.
This section introduces our model, which will be analyzed in Section 4. We
consider a medieval polity with four types of player: a ruler, merchants, con-
sumers, and a tax collector. For simplicity, we assume that all players are risk-
neutral.
3.1. Merchants
There is a large number X of small identical individual merchants who can sell a
homogeneous good at a cost c > 0 per unit of the good. The set of all merchants
is denoted by A. Each merchant is endowed with capital K > 0.
3.2. Consumers
Consumers are represented by the inverse demand function for the good, given
by P (θ, q) ≡ θ(a− bq), where a and b are positive constants, while θ is a random
variable taking the value θL with probability π and the value θH with probability
1 − π (θH > θL > 0). Thus θ represents a variety of possible factors affecting
local demand, including income and preference shocks linked, for example, to
changes in demographic and environmental conditions (e.g. disease, weather,
pests). This formulation has the advantage of capturing in an extremely simple
and parsimonious way the importance of “local conditions”, which are observed
either not at all or only imperfectly by the ruler.
23For a more detailed discussion of this evidence, see Dessí and Ogilvie (2003).
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3.3. The ruler
The ruler governs the polity: he provides certain public goods, such as law enforce-
ment and defence, and finances these with various sources of revenue, including
the taxation of trade. He also spends on activities that provide him with private
benefits, such as military campaigns and court display.24 For the purpose of our
analysis it is sufficient to treat his expenditures and his other sources of revenue
as given exogenously, and to focus on the revenue he can raise from the taxation
of trade. We assume that the ruler’s objective is simply to maximize his revenues
from this source. This can be justified by noting that, during the historical period
we are considering, consumer welfare had relatively little weight in the typical
ruler’s preferences, subject only to the constraint that it should not fall so low as
to provoke a popular revolt. We can then think of the taxation of the one good
in our model as representing the taxation of all those commodities for which this
constraint was not binding.
We assume that the ruler has the power to tax trade,25 and to grant economic
privileges to merchants; these privileges are discussed in greater detail below.
3.4. The tax collector
The tax collector is an agent who can be hired by the ruler to impose and collect
an ad valorem tax on trade τ . The agent, unlike the ruler, can observe the
state of nature, θ, and make the tax rate depend on it. We assume that the
tax collector, being a single agent and not wealthy, is endowed with very little
capital, which is normalized to zero. The zero capital assumption is made purely
for expositional simplicity, as will become clear in Section 4: all we need for
our results is that the tax collector be capital-constrained. This assumption is
motivated by the historical evidence. In twelfth-century Catalonia, for instance,
rulers appointed as local tax-gatherers “vicars”, “bailiffs”, and “saigs”, recruited
from the ranks of minor knights, unimportant creditors, local notables, priests,
agrarian entrepreneurs, even working peasants. All of these agents were capital-
constrained.26 Sometimes rulers sold the right to collect certain taxes to wealthy
24See Brewer (1989) for evidence that pre-modern rulers spent the vast majority of their
revenues on military activity and court display.
25This assumption is consistent with the historical evidence: medieval rulers were able to
tax trade through the imposition of ad valorem taxes such as tolls, purchase taxes, staples,
brokerage dues, anchorage, cranage, and keelage. See Bernard (1972); Bisson (1984); Dessí and
Ogilvie (2003); and Reyerson (2000).
26Bisson (1984). See also Blockmans (2000) and Fryde (1958) for evidence on the socio-
economic origins of the men appointed to collect taxes by the the thirteenth-century Counts of
Flanders and the fourteenth-century kings of England, which further supports our assumption
of capital-constrained tax collectors.
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“tax farmers”, but this simply transferred to the tax farmers the problem of
delegating tax collection, and was presumably reflected in the purchase “price”
they were willing to pay.
3.5. Information
To summarize, our key informational assumption is the following: consumers,
merchants, and the tax collector (if hired) are aware of local conditions (θ), but
these are not observed by the ruler.
The historical importance of the information asymmetry between rulers and
other agents concerning fiscally relevant data is well documented. Medieval rulers
did not possess a civil service which could be trusted to provide accurate infor-
mation on local fiscal conditions of which consumers and merchants were aware,
but rather employed a variety of agents who proved, to a greater or lesser degree,
unreliable.27
3.6. Timing
The timing of the model is as follows:
· at t = 0, the ruler decides whether to grant recognition to a merchant guild
(see the detailed discussion in Section 4 below) and whether to hire an agent as
tax collector. Ex ante transfers between the ruler and the guild or the agent, if
any, take place at this stage.
· at t = 1, the state of nature θ is realized. Trade takes place and taxes, if any,
are levied. Ex post transfers between the ruler and the guild or the agent, if any,
take place after trade.
3.7. Bargaining power
We assume that the ruler has all the bargaining power at t = 0. Thus if he hires
an agent to collect taxes, he can do so by making him a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Indeed, it seems likely that an agent who refused the ruler’s offer to work for him
would have incurred some explicit and/or implicit sanction; moreover, the ruler
could easily have found another agent willing to accept the offer. Similarly if the
ruler decides to establish a subset of merchants as a merchant guild with a given
set of privileges and obligations, he can do so by making them a take-it-or-leave-it
27The fiscal accounts of medieval Catalonia, for instance, show an unceasing struggle on the
part of the Count-Kings to recruit more reliable agents to impose and collect taxes, and to devise
more effective mechanisms for controlling the frequent fiscal malfeasance of their castellans,
vicars, bailiffs, and saigs, resulting from the latter’s superior information about local conditions.
See Bisson (1984), and the discussion in Dessí and Ogilvie (2003).
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offer. Merchants, before becoming organized in guilds, would have been in a poor
position to exercise bargaining power in negotiating with the ruler.28
4. Trade, taxation and merchant guilds
We begin by considering what the ruler can achieve when merchants are not
organized in a guild, then proceed to examine the role of guilds.
4.1. Trade and taxation in the absence of merchant guilds
In the absence of merchant organizations, the ruler hires an agent who can observe
local conditions (θ), as well as realized trade (quantities and price). The agent
is given the power to impose and collect an ad valorem tax τ : that is, for each
unit of the good sold at price P , the tax collector takes τP and the merchant is
left with (1− τ)P . In order to maximize tax revenue in each state of nature, the
tax rate τ should depend on θ. The revenue-maximizing state-contingent tax rate
τ ∗(θ), as well as equilibrium prices, trade levels and total tax revenues, are given
by the following Proposition.
Proposition 1When individual merchants are not organized in guilds, the ad
valorem tax on trade τ ∗(θ) which maximizes tax revenue in each state of nature,
is given by τ ∗(θ) = (aθ − c)/(aθ + c). When the tax rate is τ ∗(θ), equilibrium
levels of trade, prices and total tax revenues are equal to q∗(θ) = (a − c/θ)/2b,
P (q∗(θ), θ) = (aθ + c)/2, T ∗(θ) = τ ∗P ∗q∗ = (aθ − c)(a− c/θ)/4b.
Proof : see Appendix.
As might be expected, the revenue-maximizing tax rate, as well as the equi-
librium price and quantity traded, and hence total tax revenues, are higher in
the “good” state (θH). We can now define the first-best outcome from the ruler’s
point of view as the outcome in which he receives the total tax revenues described
by Proposition 1. In this case, his expected utility is given by:
UFB = πT ∗(θL) + (1− π)T ∗(θH).
The problem for the ruler is that, unlike the agent, he cannot observe either
the state θ, or the realized levels of trade (q∗), or prices (P ∗). In what follows, we
consider two possibilities. To begin with, we assume that the ruler can observe
the tax rate τ applied by the agent. We consider this case because it might have
been possible for the ruler, at relatively low cost, to check (e.g. through occasional
28Thus, for instance, the merchants of Lombard and Carolingian Italy in the period c. 600 -
c. 1100 were only able to trade because they obtained privileges from the royal court, landown-
ing nobles, or princes of the church; they were not yet able to form autonomous corporate
organizations, and instead were heavily dependent on royal or aristocratic favour. See Racine
(1985).
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random inspections) whether the agent was applying the tax rate τ rather than
any arbitrary tax rate. We shall then examine the more extreme case where the
ruler cannot observe τ : delegating taxation in this case is even more costly for
him, which only strengthens our results.
Case 1 : the ruler can observe the tax rate τ applied by the agent
In this case the agent cannot simply apply a high tax rate and claim that he
is applying the low tax rate. However, he can claim that the state is “bad” (θL)
even when in fact the state is “good” (θH). This is enough for him to capture
some rents, as shown in Proposition 2 below. Denote by T ◦(τ , θ) the total tax
revenue that the agent can collect in state θ by applying the tax rate τ .
Proposition 2 Assume that the ruler can observe the tax rate τ applied by
the agent, but cannot observe the true state of nature θ, realized levels of trade,
prices, or tax revenues. In this case the second-best agreement between the ruler
and the agent will specify the following:
(a) the tax rate to be applied in state θH , τ ◦(θH) = τ ∗(θH);
(b) the tax rate to be applied in state θL, τ ◦(θL) = (πa−αc)/(πa+αc) < τ ∗(θL),
where α = 1/θL − (1− π)/θH ;
(c) the transfer the agent should make to the ruler in state θH , t(θH) =
T ◦(τ ◦(θH), θH)− T ◦(τ ◦(θL), θH) + T ◦(τ ◦(θL), θL) < T ∗(θH);
(d) the transfer the agent should make to the ruler in state θL, t(θL) =
T ◦(τ ◦(θL), θL) < T ∗(θL).
The ruler’s expected utility from this agreement is given by UDM = πT ◦(τL, θL)+
(1− π)[T ◦(τH , θH)− T ◦(τL, θH) + T ◦(τL, θL)].
Proof : see Appendix.
The intuition for this result is the following. If the ruler simply required the
agent to pay him a transfer equal to the maximum (first-best) tax revenues that
can be collected in each state (i.e. T ∗(θH) in state θH and T ∗(θL) in state θL), the
agent would have an incentive to cheat in state θH , claiming that the state was
θL, even though he would then be obliged to apply the lower tax rate, τ ∗(θL). By
doing so, he could earn strictly positive rents; moreover, this outcome would be
very inefficient from the point of view of the ruler-agent coalition, since the lower
tax rate would be applied all the time, even in the good state when a higher tax
rate is much more profitable. Proposition 2 describes the second-best outcome,
taking into account the constraint due to asymmetric information between the
ruler and the agent. As is well-known in adverse selection models of this kind,
the second-best outcome entails no distortion in the “good” state, implying that
the tax rate is set at its first-best level, whereas there is a distortion in the “bad”
state, implying that the tax rate is set at a level strictly below the first-best: this
is needed to discourage cheating, by making it very costly to claim that the state
is θL when in fact it is θH .
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We can compare this second-best outcome with the first-best outcome de-
fined earlier, in which tax revenues are maximized in each state and entirely
appropriated by the ruler. The second-best outcome entails a loss for the ruler
(UDM < UFB), for two reasons: first, because total tax revenues are “too low” in
the bad state; second, because even in the good state, although tax revenues are
maximized, the ruler receives only a fraction of them - the remainder is kept by
the agent, and represents the agent’s informational rents.
In fact, even this second-best outcome may not be feasible. Given the agree-
ment with the ruler described by Proposition 2, the agent may be tempted to
collude with merchants in the “good” state, applying the lower tax rate in ex-
change for a bribe. If such collusion is difficult to detect, the ruler will always
receive the lower transfer, t(θL) = T ◦(τ ◦(θL), θL) < T ∗(θL). But then the ruler
will prefer to adopt a scheme in which the transfer is set equal to t = T ∗(θL),
irrespective of the state θ. There are two possibilities of interest: one possibility
is to leave complete autonomy to the agent to set the tax rate, subject only to the
constraint of having to pay the transfer T ∗(θL) to the ruler. This would enable the
agent to set the revenue-maximizing tax rate in each state, and capture rents of
value T ∗(θH)− T ∗(θL) in the good state. The second possibility is to set a single
tax rate, τ = τ ∗(θL). In this case the agent obtains smaller rents in the good
state, of value T ◦(τ ∗(θL), θH)− T ∗(θL). The ones who benefit from the reduction
in the agent’s rents are consumers, since a greater quantity of the good is sold at a
lower price in the good state. The ruler’s expected utility is the same, and is given
by UC = T ∗(θL). Although we have assumed, for simplicity, that the ruler only
cares about maximizing his revenues, it seems reasonable to suppose that, for a
given level of his revenues, the ruler prefers to make consumers better off (i.e. the
vast majority of the population), rather than increasing the tax collector’s rents.
Thus in what follows we shall assume that when collusion is difficult to detect the
ruler sets the transfer t = T ∗(θL) and the tax rate τ = τ ∗(θL).
Case 2 : the ruler cannot observe the tax rate τ applied by the agent
The best the ruler can do in this case is to set the transfer t = T ∗(θL), ir-
respective of the state θ, leaving complete autonomy to the agent to set the tax
rate. The implications of this case were already considered above.
Could the ruler ever achieve the first-best with delegated taxation? One simple
way to solve the ruler’s problem, if the agent had sufficient capital ex ante, would
be for the agent to purchase the right to tax the merchants. He could then set
the revenue-maximizing tax rate in each state of nature, τ ∗(θ). A simple contract
that would work (while minimizing the need for ex ante capital) is the following:29
· ex ante (at t = 0), the agent makes a payment L to the ruler, where
29This assumes that the ruler can commit not to “steal” L and then hire another agent to
collect taxes - e.g. for reputational reasons.
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L = (1− π)[T ∗(θH)− T ∗(θL)];
· ex post (at t = 1), after he has collected tax revenues, the agent makes
a second payment to the ruler, of value T ∗(θL).
However, we have assumed that the agent has insufficient capital ex ante,
and therefore cannot pay L. As we saw earlier, the assumption that the agent
is capital-constrained is consistent with available evidence on the socioeconomic
origins of the men appointed to collect taxes by medieval rulers such as the twelfth-
and thirteenth-century Count-Kings of Catalonia, the thirteenth-century Counts
of Flanders, and the fourteenth-century kings of England. This is where the
establishment of a merchant guild can benefit the ruler, as will now be discussed.
4.2. Merchant guilds: trade, taxation and privileges
A possible solution to the ruler’s problem, enabling him to achieve the first-best,
is the following. A subset of merchants S organize themselves as a group, able to
act in the group members’ collective interest: call this group “the guild”. Assume
that, by pooling their resources, guild members have sufficient capital to make an
ex-ante payment L to the ruler. Then the ruler grants the guild privileges that
enable it to earn monopoly profits from trade. In return, the guild pays L to the
ruler ex ante and T ∗(θL) once trade has occurred, and is exempted from paying
any other taxes.
Under what conditions can the guild implement this first-best solution? The
answer to this question will shed light on the privileges that the ruler will be
willing to grant to the guild. Clearly, the guild needs to be able to:
(a) enforce the profit-maximizing levels of trade, q∗(θ), and prices, P ∗(θ). In
particular, this means preventing non-members from trading, or obliging them to
trade with guild members and not directly with consumers (so that the guild can
earn monopoly profits from trade), and ensuring that individual members do not
deviate from the group norms established to promote their collective interest (for
example, by trading at prices below P ∗(θ)).
(b) levy dues on members, so as to make the required payments to the ruler.
We therefore have the following result:30
Proposition 3 As long as KX ≥ L, the ruler can achieve the first-best out-
come, which gives him expected utility UFB, by establishing a merchant guild en-
dowed with monopoly rights over local trade, the right to levy duties on its mem-
30This result assumes implicitly that the ruler can commit not to “cheat” the guild by accept-
ing the payment L at t = 0 and then withdrawing its privileges and hiring an agent to levy taxes
at t = 1. In Proposition 4, which is relegated to the Appendix for expositional convenience, we
examine under what conditions the ruler can make such a (credible) commitment in a repeated
game setting.
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bers, and the right to impose sanctions on guild members who deviate from guild
norms. The guild makes a transfer of value L to the ruler ex ante and another
transfer of value T ∗(θL) ex post.
Proof : The ruler at t = 0 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a subset of
merchants S, requiring them to pay L ex ante and T ∗(θL) ex post. In return,
the ruler establishes them as a merchant guild with monopoly rights over local
trade, the right to levy duties on members and the right to sanction members
who deviate from guild norms; moreover, he exempts them from other forms of
taxation. Since KX ≥ L, the ruler can always find a subset of merchants S
endowed with sufficient capital to accept the offer and make the required ex ante
payment. ¤
4.3. Discussion and welfare implications
Was the establishment of merchant guilds beneficial to society as a whole? Our
model sheds some light on this question. If, as we argue below in the light of the
historical evidence, our model captures the key reason why medieval rulers were
willing to establish merchant guilds and endow them with privileges, then the
answer hinges on a comparison of the welfare implications of the “guild solution”
described by Proposition 3 with the welfare implications of delegated taxation.
These may be summarized as follows:
(1) The ruler is better off with the guild solution; indeed, unlike delegated
taxation, this solution yields the first-best outcome from his point of view.
(2) Merchants are indifferent: they make zero profits in the competitive envi-
ronment with delegated taxation, while in the guild solution the transfers to the
ruler are set so as to give them zero expected profits.
(3) The agent who is hired as a tax collector under delegated taxation is
clearly worse off with the guild solution, since he loses the opportunity to earn
informational rents.
(4) The implications for consumers depend on the informational assumptions
we make for delegated taxation. In Section 4.1 we identified three possibilities in
principle:
(a) the ruler can observe the tax rate applied by the agent, and can detect
and punish (and thereby deter) collusion between merchants and the agent. In
this case the tax rates are given by Proposition 2 above; comparing this to the
guild solution shows that consumers are better off with delegated taxation, since
the tax rate in the “bad” state is lower, implying a lower price and higher level of
trade in equilibrium.
(b) the ruler can observe the tax rate applied by the agent, but cannot detect
collusion between merchants and the agent. In this case the ruler sets the state-
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independent tax rate τ = τ ∗(θL). Consumers are, once more, better off with
delegated taxation (this time because the tax rate in the “good” state is lower).
(c) the ruler cannot observe the tax rate applied by the agent. He therefore
sets the transfer t = T ∗(θL) and leaves the agent free to impose the revenue-
maximizing tax rate in each state. Consumers are indifferent between delegated
taxation and the guild solution.
In reality, the available historical evidence shows that rulers set the (state-
independent) tax rate: they did not give their tax collectors discretion in setting
(state-contingent) tax rates. In our model, this outcome occurs when the ruler
observes the tax rate applied by the agent, but cannot easily detect and deter
collusion between merchants and the agent. In this case, as described under 4(b)
above, the establishment of merchant guilds implies a loss for consumers. Thus,
in sharp contrast with GMW, we find that the establishment of merchant guilds,
far from benefiting society at large, was detrimental to the vast majority of its
members (i.e. consumers).
As for merchants, notice that their indifference is due to the assumption that
the ruler has all the bargaining power in his dealings with merchants. This was
certainly the case when merchant guilds were first established, as discussed in
Section 3.7 above. However, the assumption need not apply to the subsequent
historical evolution of merchant guilds. The historical evidence shows that over
time some merchant guilds became a source of valuable political support for rulers,
notably against the landholding nobility.31 This must have given them a degree
of bargaining power relative to rulers, enabling them to capture some of the rents
from trade.
5. The collusion model: implications and evidence
As we saw in the previous section, our explanation for the emergence of merchant
guilds generates predictions and welfare implications that are very different from
those associated with the explanation proposed by GMW. In section 2 above, we
identified the key empirical implications of their commitment model, and con-
fronted them with the available historical data. In this section we apply the same
approach to our theory. For ease of exposition, we refer to our theory as the
“collusion model”.
5.1. Empirical implications
Our theory of the emergence of local merchant guilds has the following five key
empirical implications. We should find that:
31See Dessí and Ogilvie (2003).
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(1) Rulers were willing to establish and support local merchant guilds, and
endow them with monopoly rights over local trade. These monopoly rights might
take different forms, including the right to exclude non-members from trade alto-
gether, and the requirement for non-members to trade only with members of the
guild (and not directly with consumers), or using guild members as intermediaries.
(2) Local merchant guilds established norms to promote their collective in-
terest, particularly relating to prices, volume of trade, transactions with non-
members, etc. These norms were needed to ensure guild members could earn
monopoly profits from trade.
(3) Local merchant guilds were able to impose sanctions to ensure that their
members did not deviate from these norms.
(4) Local merchant guilds were able to levy dues from their members, which
were used, at least partly, to make transfers to the ruler.
(5) Local merchant guilds were granted exemptions from other forms of taxa-
tion by the ruler.
As we demonstrate below, the historical evidence strongly supports all five of
these implications of our model.
What about alien merchant guilds? Our model, as outlined in section 4 above,
focuses on the taxation of local trade and the relationship between each polity’s
ruler and its merchants. However, the model also sheds some light on the role
of alien merchant guilds. In the model, what matters to the ruler is to maxi-
mize his revenues from the taxation of trade. In the “guild solution” described
by Proposition 3, this is achieved by giving the guild monopoly rights, in return
for transfers equal to the expected value of monopoly profits from trade. This
is consistent with the establishment of local merchant guilds endowed with the
right to exclude local non-members from trade, and the right to require alien mer-
chants to trade only with local guild members, or using local guild members as
intermediaries (brokers). As we document below, this is exactly what happened
in the vast majority of medieval European cities. Notice of course that exclud-
ing alien merchants would have been inefficient: alien merchants were buyers as
well as sellers (i.e. they increased demand); moreover, they often had a cost or
monopoly advantage in providing certain commodities. This explains why local
non-members were simply excluded from trade, whereas alien merchants were re-
quired to trade only with local guild members, or through their intermediation,
thereby giving all the bargaining power to local merchant guilds in their dealings
with individual alien merchants coming to trade in their cities.
Thus alien merchants could typically benefit from becoming organized as mem-
bers of a guild. Of course many of them were already members of the local mer-
chant guilds of their cities of origin. These guilds therefore had an incentive to
establish branches in alien cities where a sufficiently large number of their mem-
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bers traded on a regular basis, in order to promote their interests in those cities
and give them some bargining power relative to the cities’ local merchant guilds.
This is consistent with the historical evidence reviewed in Section 2.4.1, showing
that merchants often established “colonies” or “consulates” of their local merchant
guild in alien polities. In our view, therefore, the establishment and proliferation
of alien merchant guilds was to a large extent a consequence of the establishment
and proliferation of local merchant guilds, which in turn emerged primarily be-
cause of the fiscal benefits they offered to rulers. This is, again, consistent with
the historical evidence presented in Section 2.4.1 on the evolution of local and
alien merchant guilds.
Why were local rulers willing to grant legal recognition to alien merchant
guilds? A simple answer would be that the guilds might otherwise have boycotted
trade with those rulers who refused them legal recognition. Our model suggests
an additional explanation: alien merchant guilds could represent an alternative
way of implementing the “guild solution” of Proposition 3 for particular markets
and particular commodities. This suggests that the evolution of relations between
local rulers, local merchant guilds and alien merchant guilds over time should be
thought of essentially as a dynamic common agency game,32 with the ruler as the
common agent, and the guilds making offers of transfers linked to the granting
of different privileges (monopoly rights, tax exemptions). In practice, this must
have occurred under conditions of asymmetric information; thus, for example, the
local guild probably possessed better information concerning local trade, while
each alien guild probably had superior knowledge of its own costs. The analysis of
such a game is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper, but this perspective
points to a further empirical implication, which could not be obtained from the
GMW commitment model:
(6) We should find that local rulers were willing to grant economic privileges
to alien merchant guilds, including monopoly rights over certain lines of business
and tax exemptions, in return for transfers. The granting of such privileges would
have been opposed by the local merchant guild.
5.2. The historical evidence
The available historical evidence, reviewed below, strongly supports all of the six
implications outlined above. Once more, for reasons of space, we provide a very
32On common agency games, see particularly the pioneering work by Bernheim and Whinston
(1986(a), 1986(b)). Common agency has been used to model strategic lobbying by a number
of authors; see, among others, Dixit et al. (1997) and Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995(a),
1995(b)). For a comprehensive account of the literature on interest group politics, see Grossman
and Helpman (2001).
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succinct summary; a wealth of additional examples can be found in Dessí and
Ogilvie (2003).
5.2.1. Rulers were willing to establish and support local merchant guilds,
and endow them with monopoly rights over local trade.
From the late Dark Ages on, we know about merchant guilds precisely because
of the legal recognition they were granted in charters from rulers, often alongside
a variety of privileges.33 Among the most important of these privileges were a
wide array of powers enabling them to exclude and discriminate against alien
merchants.34 Thus in most medieval European towns, non-local merchants had
to submit to so-called “rights of staple”, which required them to unload their
wares in municipal warehouses where members of the local merchant guild had
the right to purchase them at privileged prices.35 In most cities, the local merchant
guild also enjoyed rights of brokerage, which forbade alien merchants from trading
directly with one another or with local customers, obliging them instead to trade
through local brokers who were appointed by the local merchant guild from its
own membership.36
Local merchant guilds also enjoyed legal privileges enabling them to exclude
from trade local individuals who were not members of the guild. Furthermore,
they were able to impose significant restrictions on guild membership by making
admission contingent on a range of requirements, including approval by a suffi-
cient proportion of existing members, payment of entry fees (sometimes set at
prohibitively high levels for particular categories, e.g. craftsmen), satisfaction
of catch-all “reputation clauses”, and requirements based on gender, ethnicity,
religion, residence, citizenship, and property ownership.37
5.2.2. Local merchant guilds established norms to ensure that their
members enjoyed rents
Medieval merchant guilds “submitted themselves to certain common rules with
regard to prices, quantities, chartering and lading, the organisation of convoys
33See, for instance, Blockmans (2000); Choroskevic (1996); De Roover (1963); Frölich (1934);
Kuske (1939); Volckart and Mangels (1999).
34See Dessí and Ogilvie (2003); Hibbert (1963); Irsigler (1985); Leguay (2000); Postan (1973);
Reyerson (2000); Schultze (1908); Spufford (2000).
35Bernard (1972); Kuske (1939); Reyerson (2000); Schultze (1908); Volckart and Mangels
(1999).
36Bernard (1972); Choroskevic (1996); Hibbert (1963); Schultze (1908); Spufford (2000).
37See Dessí and Ogilvie (2003); Dilcher (1985); Ehbrecht (1985); Epstein (2000); Hibbert
(1963); Leguay (2000); Planitz (1940); Postan (1973); Racine (1985); Reyerson (2000); Schultze
(1908); Schulz (1985); Schütt (1980); Smith (1940).
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and disputes between members of the group”.38 Thus for example the tenth-
century Constantinople merchant guilds forbade members to compete with one
another on shop-rents and to offer higher wages to employees.39 The thirteenth-
century privileges of the Laufen river-merchants in Austria prevented any member
from having more than three ships.40 The thirteenth-century Karimi merchant
association in Alexandria enjoyed privileges from the Mamluk rulers enabling it to
fix the prices on Egyptian spice exchanges.41 Sometimes the economic rationale
for guild norms was less explicit, but nevertheless clear: for instance, the statutes
of a French guild, dating from the second half of the eleventh century, declared
that “a foreign merchant who was the enemy of one member was to be treated as
the enemy of all”.42
5.2.3. Local merchant guilds imposed sanctions on members who vio-
lated their norms
These sanctions typically took the form of fines and confiscations, and occasionally
more extreme forms, such as imprisonment, shaving, flogging, or expulsion from
the guild.43 For example, in the thirteenth century the Leicester merchant guild
threatened expulsion for any member who did business with a certain Flemish
merchant who had violated the guild’s monopoly over the wool trade in the sur-
rounding countryside,44 while the merchant guilds of tenth-century Constantino-
ple imposed penalties of flogging, shaving, or confiscation on any member or
outsider who violated their by-laws.45
5.2.4. Local merchant guilds were able to levy dues from their members,
and used them at least partly to make transfers to the ruler
Throughout medieval Europe, wherever their activities are recorded in detail,
local merchant guilds levied financial contributions from their members. Dues
included entry fees, various types of license fee (e.g. the silk-merchants’ guild
38Bernard (1972).
39Freshfield (1938); Racine (1985).
40Störmer (1985).
41Ashtor (1983). For other examples of norms fostered by merchant guilds to secure rents for
their members, see Daenell (1905); De Roover (1963); Dessí and Ogilvie (2003); Fryde (1985);
Hoffmann (1980); Irsigler (1985); Planitz (1940); Prevenier (2000); Schütt (1980); Smith (1940);
Volckart and Mangels (1999).
42Volckart and Mangels (1999), citing Planitz (1940).
43Choroskevic (1996); Dessí and Ogilvie (2003); Freshfield (1938); González de Lara (1991);
Planitz (1940); Racine (1985); Schulze (1985); Schütt (1980).
44Bateson (1899).
45Freshfield (1938), Racine (1985).
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of tenth-century Constantinople levied a license fee on all members who bought
workshops, which was delivered to the political authorities),46 and regular (e.g.
annual) membership dues.47 Local merchant guilds then used these financial con-
tributions to make transfers to rulers. For example, Spanish merchant guilds
routinely made financial contributions to rulers, getting “a quid pro quo in the
form of renewal and enlargement of the guild privileges ... it was the rule rather
than the exception for the Consulado to pay substantial sums for privileges and
other favors granted by the crown”.48 Transfers to the ruler were usually made as
lump-sum payments, but they could also take the form of advantageous loans.49
5.2.5. In return, the local merchant guild was often exempted from
other forms of taxation by the ruler
Indeed, freedom from customs, tolls, and trade-taxes was one of the most universal
of the privileges rulers conferred on merchant guilds.50
5.2.6. Rulers granted economic privileges to alien merchant guilds, in-
cluding monopoly rights over certain lines of business and tax
exemptions, in return for transfers; these were strongly opposed
by local merchant guilds
In the vast majority of documented cases, rulers welcomed the establishment of
alien merchant guilds and granted them economic privileges. This occurred in
polities as distant and different as Norway,51 Constantinople,52 Cyprus,53 and
Jerusalem.54 The granting of such privileges to alien merchant guilds was typi-
cally opposed by the local merchant guild, whether it be in Denmark,55 Norway,56
46Freshfield (1938); Racine (1985).
47See Dessí and Ogilvie (2003); Schütt (1980); Smith (1940); Volckart and Mangels (1999).
48Smith (1940).
49See, e.g., Dessí and Ogilvie (2003); Klein (1932); Kuske (1939); Pryor (2000); Racine (1985);
Schütt (1980); Smith (1940).
50As pointed out by Planitz (1940); for examples, see Dessí and Ogilvie (2003); Ehbrecht








Bruges,57 London,58 Danzig,59 or Bilbao.60 The privileges rulers granted to alien
merchant guilds included rights to exercise monopolies over certain lines of busi-
ness: specifically, they could exclude non-members from trade, limit membership
numbers, exclude applicants with certain personal characteristics, and limit price
and quantity competition among members.61 Privileges also included tax reduc-
tions. For example, from the eleventh to the fourteenth century, the rulers of
Constantinople granted tax reductions to the merchants of (in descending order
of the value of the exemptions) Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Catalonia, Narbonne, An-
cona, Florence, and Ragusa.62
Alien merchant guilds levied dues from their members and used them to ren-
der financial payments and military assistance to rulers in return for the grant of
these economic privileges. This pattern is, again, observed in the majority of docu-
mented cases, in polities as diverse as Denmark,63 Russia,64 Egypt,65 Jerusalem,66
and Venice.67
6. Conclusions
“Social capital” is widely advocated as the cure to many modern economic ills,
and history is mined for examples of institutions that generate it. Merchant guilds
are unquestionably economists’ favourite example of an institution whose social
capital benefited entire economies.
We question this rosy view of merchant guilds and their social capital. True,
merchant guilds did constitute closely knit “social networks” in which members
transacted with one another repeatedly in a wide variety of different spheres of
activity, thereby generating a “social capital” of shared norms, rapid and accurate
transmission of information about members’ actions, efficient punishment of devi-
ations from group norms, and effective organization of collective action. But the
norms they fostered, the information they conveyed, the deviance they punished,
57Dollinger (1970).
58Bernard (1972); Lloyd (1991).
59Postan (1973).
60Smith (1940).
61Abulafia (1986, 1997); Choroskevic (1996); De Roover (1963); Dessí and Ogilvie (2003).
62Balard (2000). For further evidence of the granting of privileges to alien merchant guilds, see
Abulafia (1978) on the twelfth-century Kings of Sicily; Abulafia (1993) on the early fourteenth-
century ruler of Cyprus; Hørby (1984) on the twelfth-century rulers of Utrecht; and De Roover





67Choroskevic (1996); Kedar (1976).
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and the collective action they organized have disturbing implications for the im-
pact of social capital on society as a whole. Merchant guilds used their social
capital to collude effectively with rulers and maximize their joint rents. Rulers
may have allocated some of these rents to providing public goods, but probably
very little: all available evidence shows that pre-modern rulers spent the vast ma-
jority of their revenues on military activity and court display, and their military
campaigns often brought few benefits to the population at large.68 Consumers
were harmed by this exercise of social capital, since they paid a higher price for
the traded goods supplied by monopolistic guilded merchants. Non-guilded mer-
chants who were excluded from guild membership were harmed by this exercise of
social capital, since they were prohibited from trading; often those excluded from
merchant guilds constituted the less well-off members of society in any case. Fi-
nally, the economy at large was harmed by this exercise of social capital because,
by acting as monopolists and raising prices, merchant guilds ensured that fewer
transactions took place. Our findings suggest strongly that economists should
focus on the negative, as well as the positive, externalities of social capital.
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8. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
In any given state of nature θ, the tax rate that maximizes tax revenues has the
following two properties: (a) it induces the same level of trade, q∗(θ), which would
be chosen by a profit-maximizing monopolist facing a constant marginal cost of
production c; (b) it leaves exactly zero profits to the (competitive) merchants. We
can therefore obtain the optimal tax rate, τ ∗(θ), by first solving the monopolist’s
problem to find q∗(θ), and then noting that, by property (b) above, we must have:
(1− τ ∗(θ))P (q∗(θ)) = c (8.1)
The monopolist would choose q∗(θ) such that:
q∗ = argmax[θ(a− bq)− c]q (8.2)





The price is then given by:
P (q∗(θ)) = θ[a− bq∗(θ)] = aθ + c
2
(8.4)
From (8.1) and (8.4), we obtain the optimal tax rate:






and hence total tax revenues:





Proof of Proposition 2
To begin with, we need to derive T ◦(τ , θ), the total tax revenue the agent can
collect in state θ by applying the tax rate τ . This will be given by:
T ◦(τ , θ) = τP (τ , θ)q(τ , θ) (8.7)
where P (τ , θ) and q(τ , θ) are the equilibrium price and quantity traded in state
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θ when the tax rate is τ . Merchants will trade up to the point where marginal
revenue equals marginal cost, i.e. P (1− τ) = c. Using this condition, we obtain:
P (τ , θ) =
c
1− τ (8.8)





Assume the ruler can observe the tax rate τ applied by the agent, but not
the true state of nature θ, nor realized values of q, P and T . Let the ex-ante
agreement between the ruler and the agent specify the following:
- the tax rate to be applied by the agent in state θi (i = H,L), τ i;
- the transfer to be made by the agent to the ruler in state θi (i = H,L), ti.
The ruler chooses τ i, ti (i = H,L) to maximize his expected revenue subject
to two types of constraint: the agent should be induced to reveal truthfully the
state of nature θ (incentive compatibility constraint), and he should be able to
raise sufficient revenues from taxation to pay the required transfer (feasibility or
limited liability constraint). The ruler’s problem is given by:
Max πtL + (1− π)tH (8.10)
s.t. T ◦(τH , θH)− tH ≥ T ◦(τL, θH)− tL (ICCH) (8.11)
T ◦(τL, θL)− tL ≥ T ◦(τH , θL)− tH (ICCL) (8.12)
T ◦(τH , θH)− tH ≥ 0 (LLH) (8.13)
T ◦(τL, θL)− tL ≥ 0 (LLL) (8.14)





◦(τH , θH)− T ◦(τL, θH) + T ◦(τL, θL) (8.16)
and the ruler’s problem can be written more simply as:
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Max πT ◦(τL, θL) + (1− π)[T ◦(τH , θH)− T ◦(τL, θH) + T ◦(τL, θL)] (8.17)
Clearly the ruler can set τH so as to maximize (1−π)T ◦(τH , θH), which implies




The ruler then has to choose τL to maximize the following expression:
L = πT ◦(τL, θL) + (1− π)[T ◦(τL, θL)− T ◦(τL, θH)] (8.19)
Using (8.7), this becomes:
L = τL[P (τL, θL)q(τL, θL)− (1− π)P (τL, θH)q(τL, θH)] (8.20)



















< τ ∗L (8.23)
Thus in state θL the tax rate is set below its first-best level, implying that:
T ◦(τL, θL) < T
◦(τ ∗L, θL) (8.24)
i.e. tax revenues are not maximized in state θL.
In state θH tax revenues are maximized, so that
T ◦(τH , θH) = T ◦(τ ∗H , θH) (8.25)
but the ruler receives only a part of the taxes collected:
tH = T
◦(τH , θH)− [T ◦(τL, θH)− T ◦(τL, θL)] < T ◦(τH , θH) (8.26)
The ruler’s expected utility is equal to:
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UDM = πT ◦(τL, θL) + (1− π)[T ◦(τH , θH)− T ◦(τL, θH) + T ◦(τL, θL)] (8.27)
which can be compared to the first-best level given by:
UFB = πT ◦(τ ∗L, θL) + (1− π)T ◦(τ ∗H , θH) > UDM (8.28)
¤
The remainder of the Appendix considers the simplest possible extension of
our model to a repeated game setting. Let the two-period model described in
Section 3 represent the stage game in an infinitely repeated game. Thus in what
follows each “period” t will represent one realization of this stage game. The
players’ common discount factor is denoted by δ. During each stage game, the
random variable θt will be an independent random draw from the distribution
described in Subsection 3.2; that is, θt takes the value θL with probability π and
θH with probability 1− π.
The timing of the game is now as follows. At t = 0, the ruler decides whether
to grant recognition to a merchant guild and on what terms. We can model this
as the offer of a long-term contract to a subset S of merchants, specifying the
privileges to be enjoyed by the guild (formed by this subset S of merchants) in
all subsequent periods t (t = 0, 1, ...∞), together with the transfers to be made
by the guild to the ruler at the beginning (y0t) and end (y1t) of each period.
The merchants can accept or refuse the offer. If they refuse, the ruler adopts
the delegated taxation solution, which gives the merchants zero profits. Denote
by USB the ruler’s expected utility from the delegated taxation solution in any
period t. If the offer is accepted, the game continues as specified in the contract,
unless one of the two parties decides to deviate (see below).
In this setting, the first-best outcome from the ruler’s ex ante (t = 0) point of
view can be defined as one in which the ruler obtains utility UFB in every period
t, implying that his ex ante expected utility is given by:
U∗ =
P
δtUFB = UFB/(1− δ).
Denote by C0 the ruler’s contractual offer to the subset S of merchants at t = 0,
and let the variable pt take value 1 if the subset S of merchants is established as
a merchant guild in period t, with all the privileges described in Proposition 3;
otherwise pt takes value 0. Thus a contract C0 is defined as C0 = {pt, y0t, y1t} for
t = (0, 1, ...,∞).
The first-best outcome can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium
of the infinitely repeated game between the ruler and the merchants as long as
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players are sufficiently patient:69
Proposition 4 Suppose that the following condition holds:
UFB/(1− δ) ≥ L+ USB/(1− δ) (C1).
Then the following strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium of the in-
finitely repeated game between the ruler and the merchants: at t = 0, the ruler
offers the contract C0 = {pt = 1, y0t = L, y1t = T ∗(θL)} for t = (0, 1, ...,∞) to the
subset S of merchants. If the merchants accept and respect the agreement, the ruler
respects the agreement. If the merchants refuse the agreement, the ruler adopts
the delegated taxation solution. If, having accepted the agreement, the merchants
deviate by not paying y0t at the beginning of any period t, the ruler withdraws
their privileges and adopts the delegated taxation solution from period t onward.
If the merchants deviate by not paying y1t at the end of any period t, the ruler
withdraws their privileges and hires an agent to collect the payment due for period
t; he then adopts the delegated taxation solution from period t + 1 onward.The
merchants at t = 0 accept any offer from the ruler that gives them non-negative
expected profits. If the ruler respects the agreement, so do the merchants. If the
ruler withdraws their privileges during any period t, the merchants refuse to pay
him any further transfers.
Proof : The payments profile implied by the contract C0 gives the ruler ex-
pected utility U∗; the ruler cannot do better than this. Given the ruler’s strategy,
the merchants cannot do better than accept his offer C0 at t = 0. It remains
to show that neither the ruler nor the guild can gain by deviating in any subse-
quent period t. Suppose the guild deviates by not paying y0t at the beginning of
some period t. The ruler then withdraws its privileges and adopts the delegated
taxation solution from then on; the guild therefore cannot benefit from such a
deviation. Now suppose the guild deviates by not paying y1t at the end of some
period t. The ruler then withdraws its privileges and hires an agent to collect the
amount due for that period. Moreover, the ruler adopts the delegated taxation
solution for all subsequent periods. Thus, once more, the guild cannot benefit
from deviating. Now consider the ruler. Suppose he deviates by accepting the
transfer y0t at the beginning of some period t, then withdrawing the guild’s priv-
ileges and adopting the delegated taxation solution from then on. In this case his
payoff in period t is L + USB, and his payoff in every subsequent period is USB.
69For simplicity we abstract from the possibility of involuntary default by the guild - that is,
the possibility that at the beginning of some period t the guild may find itself with insufficient
resources to make the payment y0t (to the extent that the ruler cannot distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary default, the latter will be punished in the same way as the former). In
practice this does not seem to have been a significant problem. Moreover, it is worth emphasizing
that guilds were often able to provide non-financial assistance to the ruler (e.g. various forms
of political support) which could substitute, at least partly, for financial transfers; on this, see
Dessí and Ogilvie (2003).
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If on the other hand he does not deviate, his payoff is UFB in period t and in all
subsequent periods. Condition (C1) implies that the ruler cannot benefit from
such a deviation. ¤
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